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When Scott Dominguez and Daren Weaver were directed to enter a 25,000-gallon
tank and scrub the contents, little did they know that the seemingly routine job would
leave Dominguez with severe brain injuries and an inability to perform basic tasks for
the rest of his natural life. Dominguez’s boss, Allan Elias, owner of Evergreen
Resources Inc. based in Soda Springs, Idaho knew exactly what was at stake. 1 Elias
sent the men into the tank to clean toxic cyanide sludge and later instructed employees
to illegally dump some 8,000 gallons of it. When emergency responders and
investigators appeared on the scene, Elias lied to them in an effort to cover up his crime,
further endangering Dominguez. In May 1999, Elias was convicted of knowingly
endangering Dominguez and on April 28, 2000 he was sentenced to 204 months
incarceration, 36 months probation, and to pay $364,750 in restitution to the EPA and
millions of dollars in restitution to the victim.2
Elias’s crimes and many others like them show the need for criminal enforcement
of federal hazardous waste laws for serious, willful, chronic, and knowing actions that
endanger others and the natural environment. The U.S Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) is the primary statutory vehicle for which federal prosecutors
pursue criminal charges for the worst hazardous waste offenses throughout the
country.3 Whether the criminal investigation and prosecution of RCRA crimes actually
deters hazardous waste crimes is generally unknown.
Much scholarly attention is paid to how and why the EPA uses RCRA to craft
regulations and explores the legal effects of these regulations, but much less work has
explored how RCRA is enforced through a criminal process.4 We wish to address an
important issue often ignored in the law and policy literatures, which is the value of the
RCRA criminal enforcement regime for deterring violations of federal hazardous waste
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1
Alan Elias: (D. Idaho CR 98-070-BLW, 2000).
2
Kurt Friedemann, 2000, Boss Must Pay for Poisoning Employee, available from:
https://www.hcn.org/issues/176/5696.
The restitution ordered to the victim was vacated upon appeal. See: Elias v. United States: No. 011502 (2002).
3
U.S. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA): 42 U.S.C. §6901 et seq. (1976).
4
Joshua Ozymy and Melissa L. Jarrell, 2015, Wielding the Green Stick: An Examination of
Criminal Enforcement at the EPA under the Bush and Obama Administrations, 24 Environmental
Politics, 40-43.
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laws.5 While it is difficult to know with certainly if detection and prosecution rates can
sufficiently raise the cost of offending relative to the benefit of polluting or provide
general deterrence effects, we gather data from 1983-2019 on all environmental
criminal prosecutions stemming from EPA criminal investigations to explore the
plausibility of deterrence under RCRA. We hope our analysis adds to the discussion of
whether RCRA’s statutory provisions need strengthening to address substantive issues
with the enforcement of hazardous waste problems. We provide an overview of RCRA
below, followed by a discussion of the federal environmental criminal enforcement
process, analysis, and then offer some reasonable remedies for enhancing the federal
environmental criminal enforcement regime.
OVERVIEW OF RCRA
Escalating public concerns over hazardous waste caused Congress to act and pass
RCRA into law in 1976.6 RCRA gives EPA cradle-to-grave authority over hazardous
waste, which empowers the agency to regulate the generation, storage, transport,
import/export, treatment, and disposal of solid and hazardous wastes.7 Creating a
national framework for permitting the lifecycle of these wastes was a key task and
accomplishment of EPA.8 Today the EPA is responsible for permitting or overseeing
the permitting of some 6,600 facilities and 20,000 process units. 9

5

Wayne B. Gray and Ronald J. Shadbegian, 2005, When and Why Do Plants Comply? Paper
Mills in the 1980s, 27 Law and Policy, 238–240.; Wayne B. Gray and Jay P. Shimshack, 2011,
The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring: Review of the Empirical Evidence, 5 Review of
Environmental Economics and Policy, 3–6.; Michael J. Lynch, Kimberly L. Barrett, Paul B.
Stretesky, and Michael Long, 2016, The Weak Probability of Punishment for Environmental
Offenses and Deterrence of Environmental Offenders: A Discussion Based on USEPA Criminal
Cases, 1983-2013, 37 Deviant Behavior 1096-1097.
6
Russell Phifer, 2010, RCRA The First 30 Years of Hazardous Waste Regulation, 17 Journal of
Chemical Health & Safety, 4-7.
7
Thomas P. Eichler, 1984, The Status of RCRA in the Mid-Atlantic States, 26 Environment, 2-3.;
What qualifies as a hazardous waste, mixture, derivative, or secondary waste for purposes of
regulation under RCRA is often contested. See Jim Nickovich, 2004, EPA Broadens RCRA
Definiton of “Hazardous Waste” to include Mixtures and Derivatives, 31 Ecology Law Quarterly,
781-785.; Casey Roberts, 2005, D.C. Circuit Affirms EPA Trend Towards Reducing RCRA
Requirements for Recycling of Hazardous Secondary Materials, 32 Ecology Law Quarterly, 749756.
8
Lynn L. Bergeso, 2001, EPA Proposes Standardized RCRA Permits, 33 Pollution Engineering,
24-27.
9
U.S. EPA, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Overview (2020), available from:
https://www.epa.gov/rcra/resource-conservation-and-recovery-act-rcra-overview.; U.S. EPA,
RCRA Correction Action Cleanup Enforcement (2020), available from:
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/rcra-corrective-action-cleanup-enforcement.

2021]

Does the Criminal Enforcement of Environmental

67

RCRA is organized through Subtitles A-J.10 Subtitles A provides basic definitions,
interstate cooperation, and financial disclosure guidelines. Subtitle B creates the Office
of Solid Waste and identifies EPA authority in various areas. Subtitle C it establishes
EPA’s authority over the hazardous waste lifecycle and the development of
recordkeeping rules. EPA sought to regulate hazardous wastes under Subtitle C and set
aside other wastes for further study in 1978.11 In 1980 Congress acted to pass the Solid
Waste Disposal Act Amendments.12 The Amendments exempted many wastes
generated in large volume by extractive industries, such as drilling fluids and other
byproducts of oil, natural gas, and geothermal industry exploration, development, and
production, combustion waste from ore, such as coal, lead, phosphate rock, uranium,
any fossil fuel combination waste, and cement kiln dust from regulation as hazardous
wastes under RCRA. Instead these were regulated as special wastes.13 Much of the
fossil fuel and extractive industries were exempted from more stringent regulations had
these common hazardous substances been regulated as hazardous wastes under
RCRA.14
Subtitle D develops a framework for government cooperation to manage
nonhazardous waste.15 Nonhazardous waste includes rules for landfills and any other
waste disposal facility, rules for municipal solid waste, such as sludge from wastewater
treatment plants or drinking water treatment facilities are developed here as is
household trash.16 EPA has developed minimum guidelines for the design, location,
restrictions, and closure of any municipal or industrial waste landfill. EPA also
determines minimum standards for the incineration of nonhazardous waste and
provides guidance and rules for state permitting programs.17 The final subtitles deal
10

U.S. EPA, 2020, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Overview, available from:
https://www.epa.gov/rcra/resource-conservation-and-recovery-act-rcra-overview.
11
Environmental Science & Toxicology, 1995, Common Toxic Products Exempt from RCRA, 29,
301A-307A.s.
12
Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments: P.L. 3001(b)(2)(A) and 3001(b)(3)(A). Also known as
the Bentsen and Bevill amendments for their sponsors, senators Lloyd Bentsen and Thomas
Bevill.
13
Lynn L. Bergeson, 2004, Re-Re-Re Defining RCRA Solid Wastes, 36 Pollution Engineering,
32-33.
14
David L. Hippensteel, 1999, The RCRA Exemption for Oil and Natural Gas Exploration and
Production Wastes-What you may not Know, 6 Environmental Geosciences, 106-109.s.
15
EPA has authority over enforcement actions and often does so in conjunction with the states or
despite state actions. See Margaret May, 2003, Tenth Circuit Upholds the EPA’s Right to Overfile
under RCRA 30 Ecology Law Quarterly, 777-781.
16
Michael Somers, 2011, RCRA’s New Causation Question: Linking Ubiquitous Wastes to
Specific Defendants, 38 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 193-217.
17
U.S. EPA, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Regulations, 2020, available
from: https://www.epa.gov/rcra/resource-conservation-and-recovery-act-rcra-regulations#nonhaz.;
EPA data shows that as of 2017, 267.8 million tons of municipal solid waste (MSW) was
generated annually in the United States. Approximately, 35 percent was recycled or composted.
These figures include waste accepted from consumers and does not include construction or
demolition debris, municipal wastewater sludge, industrial debris, and other nonhazardous wastes.
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with federal responsibilities, research and development, regulation of underground
storage tanks, and standards for tracking medical waste, as well as citizen lawsuit
provisions.
ENFORCING RCRA
Criminal provisions of RCRA are found in Table 1.18 Most of these provisions
denote maximum penalties for one or more of the cradle-to-grave violations related to
treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous substances without a permit or in violation
of a permit. Transporting regulated wastes without a manifest is a related offenses, as
is transportation to an unpermitted facility. Transporting and illegally exporting
hazardous waste may also be a criminal offense. Other potential criminal charges under
CRA relate to intentional behaviors to obstruct investigations or lie to officials, such
as false statements, or the knowing alteration, destruction, or concealment of records.
In all of these cases RCRA criminal provisions take advantage of extensive
recordkeeping required of any entity that should be permitted to handle hazardous
waste through its lifecycle. Knowing endangerment is defined as any act that puts
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury as the result of any
combination of acts related to storing, treatment, transporting, disposing of, or
exporting hazardous waste.

Table 1. Criminal Provisions of the U.S. Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act
Violation
Treatment, Storage, or Disposal Without a
Permit
Treatment, Storage, or Disposal in Violation of
a Permit
Transportation of Hazardous Waste Without a
Manifest
Transportation to an Unpermitted Facility
False Statements

Maximum Penalty Per
Violation/Day
(5) Years and up to $50,000
(2) Years and up to $50,000
(2) Years and up to $50,000
(5) Years and up to $50,000
(2) Years and up to $50,000

These figures are based on surveys, data estimates, and other means.; U.S. EPA, Municipal Solid
Waste Generation, Recycling, and Disposal in the United States: Facts and Figures, 2014,
Available from: https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201803/documents/methodolgy_document_for_selected_municipal_solid_waste_products.pdf.
18
Data for Table 1 are found from the following: U.S. EPA, 2020, Criminal Provisions of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), available from:
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/criminal-provisions-resource-conservation-and-recovery-actrcra.
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Knowing Alteration, Destruction, or
Concealment
Of Records
Knowing Endangerment
Illegal Export of Hazardous Waste
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(5) Years and up to $50,000
(15) Years and up to $250,000
$1,000,000 if an Organization
(5) Years and up to $50,000

The development of federal environmental law dates back over a century.19 The
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 prohibited illegal dumping and obstruction of the
navigable waters of the United States and introduced misdemeanors in federal
environmental statutes.20 The Lacey Act of 1900, prohibited the unregulated, interstate
trade in wildlife.21 In the 1970s federal environmental law continued to add
misdemeanor provisions but it was the passage of RCRA and the hazardous and solid
waste disposal amendments in the 1980s that felony provisions were inserted and then
expanded in federal environmental law.22 Prior to the early 1980s only 25
environmental crimes were prosecuted.23
The institutionalization of a federal environmental criminal enforcement
apparatus came about in 1981 with creation of the EPA’s Office of Enforcement and
the DOJ’s Environmental Crimes Section (ECS) in 1982.24 These units began a process
of hiring and specializing in the investigation and prosecution of federal environmental
crimes.25 ECS became an independent Unit within the Environment and Natural
Resources Division (ENRD) in 1987 and employed about 40 prosecutors.26 The next
year Congress granted EPA’s Criminal Enforcement Division (CID) full law
enforcement authority.27 In 1995 the Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics and
19

DOJ-ENRD, 2019, History, available from: https://www.justice.gov/enrd/history.
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899: (33 U.S.C. 403).
21
The Lacey Act of 1900: (16 U.S. Code § 3371-3378).
22
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976: (42 U.S.C. §6901).; U.S. Department of
Justice Environmental Crimes Section, 2015, Historical Development of Environmental Criminal
Law, available from: https://www.justice.gov/enrd/about-division/historical-developmentenvironmental-criminal-law.
23
Celia, B. Campbell-Mohn. SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. St. Paul, Minnesota:
(West Publishing Company 1993).
24
U.S. EPA, 2011, Criminal Enforcement Program. Available from:
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/oceft-overview-2011.pdf.
25
Theodora Galactos, The United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section: A
Case Study of Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict over Congressional Oversight and the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 64 Fordham Law Review, 590, (1995).
26
U.S. Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section, 2015, Historical Development of
Environmental Criminal Law, available from: https://www.justice.gov/enrd/aboutdivision/historical-development-environmental-criminal-law.; ENRD dates to 1909, when it was
referred to as the Public Lands Division.
27
Criminal investigators were deputized by the U.S. Attorney General in 1984 as Special Deputy
United States Marshals, requiring regular renewal until 1988. See John Peter Suarez, 2003,
20
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Training (OECFT) was created to centralize criminal investigative work within the
broader Office of Environmental Compliance Assurance (OECA) that came to replace
the Office of Enforcement.28 Civil judicial actions are overseen by the Environmental
Enforcement Section (EES) of ENRD.29 EPA-CID now contains some 150 criminal
investigators and related staff located across 41 offices.30
Significant harm and culpable conduct are the general requirements for a case
being pursued for criminal prosecution.31 EPA criminal investigators, also known as
special agents or 1811s enjoy autonomy to investigate and sources for investigations
often come from self-reported documents, civil inspectors that notice potential
problems, state or local environmental agencies that may have already issued citations,
penalties or warnings, and former employees of a company.32 Cooperation on criminal
investigations is common and often undertaken with other state and local agencies.33 If
criminal investigators feel there is sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution, they may
approach prosecutors in ECS or the U.S Attorney’s Office to seek an indictment from
a grand jury or file an information with the appropriate District Court.34
For deterrence to be effective, the cost of committing a RCRA crime must
outweigh the financial benefits of the offense among rational offenders.35 EPA-CID
and DOJ-ECS focus on investigating, punishing, and hopefully deterring serious,
chronic, and willful violations of federal hazardous waste laws.36 Both agencies have

Management Review of the Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics and Training, 7, available
from: https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/oceft-review03.pdf.
28
U.S. EPA, 2020, Basic Information on Enforcement, available from:
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/basic-information-enforcement.
29
DOJ-ENRD, 2015, Environmental Enforcement Section (EES): An Overview of Our Practice,
available from: https://www.justice.gov/enrd/overview-our-practice.
30
U.S. EPA, 2020, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Enforcement Program:
America’s Environmental Crime Fighters. Available from:
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/oceftbrochure.pdf.
31
Earl E. Devaney, 1994 The Exercise of Investigative Discretion, 3-4, available from:
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/exercise.pdf.
32
Joel A. Mintz, 2004, Treading Water: A Preliminary Assessment of EPA Enforcement During
the Bush II Administration, 34 Environmental Law Reporter, 10912.; John Peter Suarez, 2003,
Management Review of the Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics and Training, 16, available
from: https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/oceft-review03.pdf.
33
Joel A. Mintz, 2006, Some Thoughts on the Interdisciplinary Aspects of Environmental
Enforcement, 36 Environmental Law Reporter, 10495.
34
Joel A. Mintz, Enforcement at the EPA: High Stakes and Hard Choices, (Austin: University of
Texas Press 2012).
35
Gary Becker, 1968, Punishment: An Economic Approach, 169 The Journal of Political
Economy, 183.
36
EPA faces very strong incentives to pursue civil, rather than criminal enforcement, due to lower
burdens of proof in civil cases, costs, and the range of non-criminal options. See Evan J. Ringquist
and Craig E. Emmert, 1999, Judicial Policymaking in Published and Unpublished Decisions: The
Case of Environmental Civil Litigation, 52 Political Research Quarterly, 12.; Jeremy Firestone,
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organizational cultures emphasizing punishment and deterrence.37 For this process to
deter hazardous waste crimes, the probability of detection must be suitably high and
the severity of punishment sufficiently robust to deter particular offenders from
choosing to commit a crime and to set an example for others when punishment is meted
out.38 Determining the sufficiently of the probability of detection and significant
punishments being handed out when crimes are discovered are somewhat more
difficult with environmental crimes than street crimes. Many regulated individuals and
companies have no intention to break the law, sometimes polluting is not a criminal
offense, other times there may be legal ambiguity as to whether a particular act is an
offense, and many companies can remain in chronic violation with penalties attached
for years without criminal sanction. There is also much less data on environmental
crimes than street crime, making the study of such phenomena more difficult.39
The value of deterrence for the environmental criminal enforcement regime has
always had to be more surgical in its approach, given limited resources and the
changing interpretation of environmental statutes through both the courts and
regulatory rulemaking. A past Director of the Office of Enforcement, Earl E. Devaney
noted well that…it is unlikely the Office will ever be large enough in size to fully defeat
the ever-expanding universe of environmental crime…it must maximize its presence
and impact through discerning case selection, and then proceed with investigations that
advance EPA’s overall goal of regulatory compliance and punishing criminal
wrongdoing.40 Criminal enforcement may also be more circumstantial in its effect,
2002, Agency Governance and Enforcement: The Influence of Mission on Environmental
Decisionmaking. 21 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 410.
37
A management review noted of the Division in 2003, “To the extent any single pattern
dominates, it is the law enforcement orientation of the Immediate Office, CID, and (to a lesser
extent) LCRMD (Legal Counsel and Resources Management Division)”. See John Peter Suarez,
2003, Management Review of the Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics and Training, ii,
available from: https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/oceft-review03.pdf.;
U.S. Department of Justice, 2020. Press Room. Available from:
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/press-room.
38
Richard A. Posner, 1985, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Columbia Law Review,
1193-1200.
39
For studies on the difficulties of measuring corporate crime rates and deterrence see: Carol
Gibbs and Sally S. Simpson, 2009, Measuring Corporate Environmental Crime Rates: Progress
and Problems, 51 Crime, Law and Social Change, 87–90.; Harland Prechel and Alesha Istvan,
2016, Disproportionality of Corporations’ Environmental Pollution in the Electrical Energy
Industry, 59 Sociological Perspectives, 505-507.; Lori S. Bennear, 2008, What Do We Really
Know? The Effect of Reporting Thresholds on Inferences using Environmental Right-to-Know
Data, 2 Regulation & Governance, 293–295.; Carole M. Billiet and Sandra Rousseau, 2014, How
Real is the Threat of Imprisonment for Environmental Crime? 37 European Journal of Law and
Economics, 183-186.; Michael J. Lynch, 2017, The Sentencing/Punishment of Federal
Environmental/Green Offenders, 2000-2013, 38 Deviant Behavior, 991-992.
40
Earl E. Devaney, 1994 The Exercise of Investigative Discretion, 2-3, available from:
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/exercise.pdf.
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rather than intentional and surgical, given a limited ability to detect crimes and the need
to respond to known environmental problems, such as explosions, spills, and the
discovery of toxic dumps. We explore the plausibility of detection and prosecution for
RCRA crimes historically below with these limitations in mind.
DATA
We gather data on all environmental criminal prosecutions resulting from EPACID investigations using content analysis of the EPA’s Summary of Criminal
Prosecutions Database.41 We code all cases by fiscal year (FY) for all yeas available
moving from FY 1983 through the end of calendar year 2019. This data provides a very
substantive data source for understanding the nature of criminal prosecutions, given
the criminal enforcement apparatus was institutionalized in the two years prior to
1983.42 We coded all 2,588 cases and select 396 prosecutions where RCRA is a primary
charging statute. We coded the following variables for each prosecution summary: a
narrative summary, fiscal year, docket number, state identified where the crime took
place, total number of defendants identified in the case summary, and the presence of
at least one company or corporate defendant in the prosecution.
We developed coding protocols by analyzing a cases from FY 1983 through FY
2015 with two coders working for four weeks and we checked weekly for discrepancies
in their coding. Once we began to see patterns and our inter-coder reliability exceeded
90 percent, we moved forward with the analysis and coding of the data. Our coders
analyzing data independently and the lead author reviewed discrepancies until
consensus was met. Inter-coder reliability for the project was approximately 95
percent.43
Our approach and data choices have a few limitations that do not substantively
hinder the analysis, but bear mentioning here. First, we cannot understand how all of
the parties in the case influenced the outcome. This is not our primary goal, just to
catalog outcomes and this limitation is not severe. Second, if federal environmental
statutes changed or interpretations changed in the courts, we cannot control for such
change. Third, any cases not cataloged by EPA in the database are unknown to us in
the analysis. Finally, we ended our analysis at the end of calendar year 2019, meaning
the analysis that follows does not complete this fiscal year.
FINDINGS

41

U.S. EPA, 2020, Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database, available from:
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/summary-criminal-prosecutions.
42
Ozymy and Jarrell Supra note 8, at 40-45.
43
Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, 140 (Addison Wesley,
1969).; Earl R. Babbie, 2012, The Practice of Social Research (Wadsworth Publishing, 2012).
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We now move to estimate the regulatory community that must be policed in any
given year. While it is impossible to measure the population of potential criminals
outside of the regulated community, we attempt to measure the number of facilities that
EPA-CID must police each year and then compare those to both the number of criminal
investigators available to detect potential crimes and the number of prosecutions
handed down annually to get a sense of the probability of prosecution in any given
year. To determine the number of regulated firms, we select those with active
hazardous waste permits using EPA’s Enforcement Compliance History Online
(ECHO) data gathering tool.49 With ECHO we begin by selecting hazardous waste
facilities, all locations, all facilities in the database’s universe, no restrictions on
enforcement and compliance to list all facilities, and select data for Toxics Release
Inventory (TRI) On-Site Land Releases for all years available (2006-19), to capture all
permitted hazardous waste facilities reporting releases to the TRI each year.50 Total
facilities to do vary greatly over this time period from 2,977 in 2006, to a high of 3,272
in 2015, and a low of 2,788 in 2019. The average number of regulated RCRA facilities
over these fourteen years was about 3,112.51 We use this data, our data on special
agents, criminal prosecutions, and utilize the methodology from Lynch et al, as a guide
beginning in Table 2 below to begin assessing the probability of detection and
prosecution under RCRA.52
We now estimate the probability of detection by comparing the number of
criminal investigators to the number of regulate facilities, 2006-19. In table 2, we list
the year in the first column, number of investigators or special agents employed that
year in column 2, number of regulated facilities using ECHO data in column 3, the
number of facilities divided by the number of special agents in column 4. Column 4
can be misleading because not all special agents give their time to RCRA prosecutions.
In an attempt to create a measure of the percentage of investigative staff employed to
police RCRA crimes, we divide the total number of criminal prosecutions since 1983
(2,588) by the number of RCRA prosecutions, which is about 15 percent of
prosecutions, leading us to assume roughly fifteen percent of investigative capital was
employed towards RCRA-focused investigations. We divide the number of special
49

U.S. EPA, 2020, Enforcement Compliance History Online (ECHO), available from:
https://echo.epa.gov/.
50
U.S. EPA, Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program, 2020, available from:
https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program.
51
The TRI reports annual quantities of toxic chemicals from facilities throughout the country that
report EPA. To be required to report, a facility must fall within a reportable industry sector, have
ten or more full-time equivalent employees (FTE), and manufacture or process or use a regulated
chemical in amounts above legal thresholds to be required to report. These criteria exclude nonpoint sources and many smaller producers, making ours a conservative estimate of the total
facilities to be policed under RCRA. See U.S. EPA, 2019, Factors to Consider When Using Toxics
Release Inventory Data, 8, available from: https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201903/documents/factors_to_consider_march_2019.pdf.
52
Lynch et al. Supra note 5, at 1101-1103.
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agents by .15 to create a measure of RCRA special agents in column 5. In Column 6
we use this measure and divide it by the number of regulated facilities to get a better
estimate of how many RCRA-focused investigative resources are put forward relative
to regulated facilities in a given year.
Table 2. Estimating the Probability of a RCRA Criminal Investigation, 2006-19.
Year

Agents

Facilities

Facilities/Agent

RCRA Agents

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

183
168
183
186
195
215
175
165
168
154
157
147
140
145

2,977
3,033
3,123
3,050
3,140
3,160
3,180
3,229
3,206
3,272
3,183
3,137
3,084
2,788

16
18
17
16
16
15
18
20
19
21
20
21
22
19

27
25
27
28
29
32
26
25
25
23
24
22
21
22

Facilities/RCRA
Agents
108
120
114
109
107
98
121
130
127
142
135
142
147
128

Source: OECA, EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database, ECHO, TRI, and
PEER.
We find there are 183 agents at EPA-CID tasked with investigation environmental
crimes in 2006. They must police 2,977 facilities generally or an average of about 16
facilities per agent. This number assumes all resources are put towards RCRA
investigations, which greatly overestimates the human capital available for RCRA
policing. When we divide the number of facilities by .15, we estimate that only 27 of
these agents or equivalent were put forward to police RCRA crimes. This gives us an
estimate of 108 facilities that each special agent equivalent must police in a given year
to put forth any police presence annually. This number is also conservative. We
measure the regulated community conservatively by the number of permitted facilities
reporting to ECHO and TRI in a given year. In reality these agents must investigate
mobile source hazardous waste crimes, individuals, firms, and other entities without
permits, and other facilities not captured in ECHO. Even by our conservative logic and
estimates here, if a criminal investigator worked 48 weeks a wear and 5 days a week
given four weeks of personal and vacation time, that would leave 240 days per year for
policing RCRA facilities and investigating crimes. This individual would have to
undertake all of their other administrative duties and visit one facility roughly every
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2.2 days to make an appearance in 2006. As the number of criminal investigators have
decreased over time, in 2018 we estimate 21 agents for RCRA work and 147 facilities
each or each investigator would have to visit a facility about every 1.6 workdays.53
These scenarios are hypothetical. Criminal investigators must do administrative
work, engage in lengthy investigations, attend meetings, conferences, professional
development, testify in court, and many other functions. They also do not make
unannounced visits as a matter of form to police the community. Many facilities remain
in chronic violation over many years and state environmental investigators can also
make visits to these facilities. For RCRA crimes one could argue by these metrics 1.6
days to visit a facility is a reasonable estimate, absent other activities, which of course
makes it less reasonable in practice. Having a police presence for these facilities alone
with so few men and women to investigate and the difficulties of investigating large,
stationary sources of pollution make the probability of detection low, particularly when
considering other duties.
We move from the plausibility of detection to the probability of prosecution for
RCRA crimes in Table 3. In 2006, we find eleven prosecutions for CRA crimes across
2,977 regulated facilities with hazardous waste permits that report to the TRI. The basic
probability of a stationary source being prosecuted in 2006 for a RCRA violation was
about .004. There were 13 RCRA-focused prosecutions completed in 2009. With 3,050
facilities to police, the probably of being prosecuted was again about .004. The average
probability over these 14 years of being prosecuted for a RCRA crime, among
stationary sources that report to ECHO and TRI was about .3%. or .003.
Table 3. Estimating the Probability of being Prosecuted under RCRA, 2006-19.
Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
53

Total Prosecutions
11
9
8
13
12
13
12
10
11
7
9
4

Total Facilities
2,977
3,033
3,123
3,050
3,140
3,160
3,180
3,229
3,206
3,272
3,183
3,137

Probability
.0037
.0030
.0026
.0043
.0038
.0041
.0038
.0031
.0034
.0021
.0028
.0013

Lynch et al estimate that there is one police investigator for every 1,365 residents over the age
of ten in New York City as a basis of comparison here. See Lynch et al. Supra Note 5, at 11011102.
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We utilize this data in Table 4 to re-estimate the probability of a regulated facility
being prosecuted under RCRA from 2006-19 using our prosecution data and ECHO
data. Using total prosecutions as a measure in the second column, in 2006 there were
3 prosecutions across 2,977 facilities or a probability of about .001 that any of these
facilities would be prosecuted in a given year. As the number of annual prosecutions
dips to two in 2017 across 3,137 facilities, the probability of prosecution drops to about
.0006. The highest probability of prosecution comes in 2011, where 7 prosecutions
occurred and there were 3,229 facilities in the regulatory universe, or about a .2%
chance of being prosecuted that year. The average chance a regulated facility would be
prosecuted for a RCRA crime across these 14 years was low at about .1%.
Table 4. Estimating the Probability of a Firm being Prosecuted under RCRA, 200619.
Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

Total Prosecutions
3
4
2
4
6
7
3
2
6
4
3
2
3
1

Total Facilities
2,977
3,033
3,123
3,050
3,140
3,160
3,180
3,229
3,206
3,272
3,183
3,137
3,084
2,788

Probability
.0010
.0013
.0006
.0013
.0019
.0022
.0009
.0006
.0019
.0012
.0009
.0006
.0010
.0004

Source: OECA, EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database, ECHO, and
TRI.
ECHO data used to estimate the annual number of regulated facilities is only
available 2006-19. We do not find that the annual number of facilities varies greatly
during that time period. Assuming this trend is more or less accurate for our purposes
going back to 1983 we roughly measure the average number of facilities from 2006-19
to be 3,112 and use this as an annual measure of regulated firms, 1983-2019. In Figure
4 we use this average to estimate the probability of being prosecuted under RCRA,
1983-2019. We find the average probability of being prosecuted to be low. In the best
of circumstances when prosecutions were high as in 1993, when 20 were completed,
we find that across 3,112 facilities, the chance of being prosecuted was about .6% that
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year. In 2017 when only 4 prosecutions where completed, the chance of being
prosecuted was .1% that year. In the best circumstance, in 1999 when 23 prosecutions
were completed, there was a .7% chance of prosecution that year.
Figure 4. Estimating the Probability of being Criminally Prosecuted under RCRA,
1983-2019.

0.008
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0.006
0.005
0.004
0.003
0.002
0.001
0
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Source: U.S. EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database.
We go back to our measure of prosecution using only those cases where at least
one company or corporation was prosecuted in a case. When we compare these
numbers to the average number of facilities 2006-29 (3,112) and use that data to reestimate the probability of a firm being criminally prosecuted in Figure 5, our
probabilities of prosecution further decline. For example, in 1987 we find three
prosecutions containing at least one company or corporation as a defendant in a case
and an average of 3,112 facilities to police. That gives a .1% chance of being
prosecuted that year. When prosecutions reach their zenith of eleven in 1993 and 1999,
the chance of being prosecuted only increase to about .3%. Creating a measure of
average firms and moving back to the 1980s-1990s that is no longer available in ECHO
does not radically change the probability any facility in the regulated universe would
be prosecuted.
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Figure 5. Estimating the Probability of a Company being Criminally Prosecuted
under RCRA, 1983-2019.
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Source: U.S. EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database.
We find the probability of detection and prosecution for RCRA crimes moving
back to 1983 to be fairly low. All other factors aside, even a permitted company
wishing to commit a hazardous waste crime in any given year has a decidedly low
probability of being detected by EPA-CID or prosecuted by DOJ-ECS. We now
address the related issue of whether large penalty cases may provide for an additional
deterrence function for both individuals and companies. We begin exploring this
possibility by examining large-penalty cases levied against corporations for RCRA
crimes since 1983 in Table 5.
Table 5. Punitive Corporate Monetary Penalties Levied in RCRA Criminal
Prosecutions, 1983-2019.
Fiscal Year
1992
2001
2010
2011
2014
2015

Company
Rockwell International
TRW Vehicle Safety
Systems
Southern Union
Honeywell Metropolis
Works
Tonawanda Coke
Corporation
American Screw and
Rivet

Penalty
$18,501,625
$12,004,000
$18,000,000
$12,000,000
$24,700,000
$17,692,974
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Source: U.S. EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database.
Rockwell International pled guilty on June 1, 1992 for illegal discharge and
release of toxic and hazardous wastes to the Rocky Flats sewage treatment plant and
for the illegal storage and treatment of hazardous wastes.54 The company managed the
U.S. Department of Energy’s Rocky Flats nuclear weapons facilities near Golden,
Colorado. Rockwell was sentenced to pay a fine of $18.5 million, with $2 million
suspended, because the company agreed to pay $2 million to the State of Colorado. A
special assessment fee of $1,625 was also imposed.55 TRW Vehicle Safety Systems
was prosecuted for storing, treating, and illegally transporting hazardous wastes from
its Mesa II facility to a landfill in Mobile, Arizona in violation of RCRA.56 On August
20, 2001 the company was sentenced to pay $12 million in state and federal fines, a
$4,000 special assessment fee, and serve 60 months probation.57 The Southern Union
Company was found guilty of storing hazardous waste without a permit and was
sentenced on October 2, 2009 to a $6 million fine, $12 million in community service
payments, and two years probation.58 The company began removing gas regulators in
homes in 2001 and stored them in a shed. In September 2004, three youths broke into
the facility and ended up contaminating both the facility and a nearby apartment
complex.59
Honeywell Metropolis Works was prosecuted for illegally storing some 7,500
drums of radioactive and hazardous wastes. Honeywell was charged with knowingly
storing hazardous waste without a permit and was sentenced on March 11, 2011 to pay
an $11.8 million federal fine and implement a household hazardous waste program at
a cost of $200,000.60 Tonawanda Coke Corporation was prosecuted for releasing coke
oven gas containing benzene through an unreported pressure relief valve and storing,
treating, and disposing of hazardous waste without a permit. 61 The company was
sentenced on March 19, 2013 to 60 months probation, a $12.2 million community
54

Matthew L. Wald, 1992, Rockwell to Plead Guilty and Pay Large Fine for Dumping Waste,
New York Times, available from: https://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/26/us/rockwell-to-pleadguilty-and-pay-large-fine-for-dumping-waste.html.
55
Rockwell International Corporation (D. Colorado CR-92-107, 1992).
56
The company agreed to pay a total of $17.6 million to settle civil and criminal claims. See U.S.
EPA, 2020, TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc. Hazardous Waste Settlement. Available from:
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/trw-vehicle-safety-systems-inc-hazardous-waste-settlement.
57
TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc. (D. Arizona 01-10-PHX-ROS, 2001).
58
Southern Union Company (D. Rhode Island 1:07CR00134-01S, 2010).
59

The fine was later amended on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court in Southern Union Company v.
United States (567 US, 2012). See https://lawaspect.com/case-southern-union-company-v-unitedstates/.
60
Honeywell Metropolis Works (S.D. Illinois 11-CR-40006-JPG, 2011).; U.S. Department of
Justice, 2011, Honeywell Pleads Guilty to Illegal Storage of Hazardous Waste, available from:
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/honeywell-pleads-guilty-illinois-illegal-storage-hazardous-waste.
61
Tonawanda Coke Corporation: (W.D. New York 1:10-CR-00219-WMS-HKS, 2013).
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service payment, and a $12.5 million federal fine.62 American Screw and Rivet was
prosecuted for illegally storing more than 24,000 gallons of hazardous waste at their
Anderson, South Carolina facility, costing EPA over $17 million in disposal fees.63 The
company was sentenced to five years probation and ordered to pay $17,692,974 in
restitution.64
While these penalties against corporations are significant, they are by no means
as punitive as penalties for other environmental crimes such as the $4 billion penalty
levied against British Petroleum for their role in the Deepwater Horizon Disaster or
Volkswagen AG’s $2.8 billion penalty resulting from their extensive emissions rigging
scheme.65 In both of these cases criminal provisions of U.S. Clean Water Act and Clean
Air Act were used to seek extensive penalties to deter future violations from the
companies and to set examples in their various industries.66 While these rare penalties
are circumstantial to the crimes that occurred and what criminal charging statutes were
most appropriate, as well as their public salience and willingness of prosecutors to
pursue large penalties, big-penalty RCRA cases come nowhere close to this standard
to play a specific or general deterrence function for companies.
We now turn to significant incarceration penalties assessed individual defendants
in RCRA criminal prosecutions in Table 6. Charles Arcangelo and nine co-defendants
operated five junkyards, four scrap dealer businesses, and a restaurant in New Haven,
Connecticut. Charles and James Arcangelo were prosecuted under RICO (Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization) in regards to transporting and harboring illegal
aliens, mail fraud, racketeering, sale or receipt of stolen motor vehicles, illegal disposal
of hazardous waste without a permit in violation of RCRA, and other charges related

62

U.S. Department of Justice, 2013, Historic Verdict in Environmental Crime Case as Tonawanda
Coke and Manager Found Guilty of Violating the Clean Air Act and Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, available from:
https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/criminal_prosecution/index.cfm?action=3&prosecution_summar
y_id=2555&searchParams=M5%2C%3A%2FXT%2A%5CCYZ%40JZ%5DIWY45%3DXBI%3E
X%3A%29M%3B%5CSK%25%29%3F%5F%5B%202%2D%25Z%2DF%2EZ%5F%5DSMWO
Z%2A4I%20%25%5F%0AM%26A%2B1%2BEI%29%22%5BF6%21XCP%5D%3DFPWZB%2
7LY%27%2ADBX%3DN3RTFWIWZA%5D3%40%3BQ0K%29I%3C%20%5CO%3DS4X%22
%0AM5X3%3D%5C5WLME%24BJ9%5F%2F3Z%2D8V4J%2B7U%3F%3D7PR%25CE%223
W%2F%5F0L9ML%2EZB%5C%21U%2A%3E%2AY92UL%2C9%0A%27%3E%29%5E%224I
%22WE0%20%20%0A.
63
American Screw and Rivet (D. South Carolina 8:13CR724 /726, 2015).
64
WYFF4, 2015, Woman Scammed Banks, Stored 24,000 Gallons of Hazardous Waste, available
from: https://www.wyff4.com/article/woman-scammed-banks-stored-24-000-gallons-ofhazardous-waste/7012463.
65
BP, PLC: (E.D. Louisiana 2:12-CR-00292-DEK, 2013).; Volkswagen AG: (E.D. Michigan 16CR-20394, 2017).
66
U.S. Clean Air Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-604).; U.S. Clean Water Act of 1972 (33 USC 1251).
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to interstate trafficking in stolen motor vehicles.67 Collectively, defendants were
sentenced to 564 months incarceration.68
Wilbur Duane Outhwaite was prosecuted along with six other defendants
including LCP Chemicals for contaminating the company’s site near Brunswick,
Georgia. The defendants were charged with knowingly treating, storing, and disposing
of hazardous waste without a permit in violation of RCRA, conspiracy, CWA
violations, and other charges.69 In 1999 the defendants were collectively sentenced to
213 months incarceration.70 Harold Julio Fargas and representatives of the Cali
Cocaine Cartel constructed what was at the time one of the United States’ largest
cocaine manufacturing facilities in Minden, New York in 1985. The facility exploded
and investigators found 250, 55-gallon containers of ethyl ether abandoned at the
facility.71 Fargas fled and remained at large until 1999 when he was charged with
knowing endangerment under RCRA and violating the Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act.72 On December 16, 1999 Fargas was sentenced to serve 180 months
incarceration.73

67

U.S. EPA, 1989, FY89 Enforcement Accomplishments Report, available from:
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.exe/9101JPU2.TXT?ZyActionD=ZyDocument&Client=EPA&I
ndex=1986+Thru+1990&Docs=&Query=&Time=&EndTime=&SearchMethod=1&TocRestrict=n
&Toc=&TocEntry=&QField=&QFieldYear=&QFieldMonth=&QFieldDay=&IntQFieldOp=0&E
xtQFieldOp=0&XmlQuery=&File=D%3A%5Czyfiles%5CIndex%20Data%5C86thru90%5CTxt
%5C00000029%5C9101JPU2.txt&User=ANONYMOUS&Password=anonymous&SortMethod=
h%7C&MaximumDocuments=1&FuzzyDegree=0&ImageQuality=r75g8/r75g8/x150y150g16/i425&Dis
play=hpfr&DefSeekPage=x&SearchBack=ZyActionL&Back=ZyActionS&BackDesc=Results%2
0page&MaximumPages=1&ZyEntry=1&SeekPage=x&ZyPURL.
68
Charles Arcangelo: (D. Connecticut N-88-43TFGD, 1989).
69
U.S. EPA, 1999, Three Officials of LCP Chemicals Convicted, available from:
https://archive.epa.gov/epapages/newsroom_archive/newsreleases/bd048b2330fe314d8525670100
6f04a0.html.
70
William Duane Outhwaite: (S.D. Georgia CR-298-11, 1999).
71
U.S. EPA, 1999, Environmental Charges Stem from Illegal Cocaine Lab, available from:
https://archive.epa.gov/epapages/newsroom_archive/newsreleases/d5b73dfdfa7e10ce8525681800
5e6af8.html.
72
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act: 21 USC 13).
73
Harold Julio Fargas: (N.D. New York 99-CR-537, 2000).
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Table 6. Significant Incarceration Sentences in RCRA Criminal Prosecutions,
1983-2019.
Fiscal Year
Primary Defendant
Moths Incarceration
1989
Charles Arcangelo
564 Months
1999
Wilbur Duane Outhwaite 213 Months
2000
Harold Julio Fargas
180 Months
2001
Mark Anthony Dorner
953 Months
2013
Alan Elias
204 Months
2019
Charles Ferris Callihan
225 Months
Source: U.S. EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database.
Mark Anthony Dorner and seven co-defendants were prosecuted for producing
methamphetamines. Dorner and his co-defendants were charged with illegal disposal
of hazardous waste without a permit under RCRA and violating the Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act.74 Collectively, the defendants were sentenced to 953
months incarceration.75 On October 15, 2012 an explosion occurred at the munitions
bunker at Camp Minden, Louisiana. The bunker and trailer were destroyed, 11 cars
were derailed, windows shattered within a four-mile radius, and the town of Doyline,
Louisiana was evacuated. Charles Ferris Callihan and other defendants conspired to
defraud the United States by submitting false certificates to the U.S. Army that
hazardous wastes had been sent to permitted facilities and that demilitarized M6
propellants had been sold to third parties. Callihan and other officials at Explo Systems,
Inc. contracted with the military to demilitarize munitions and had been awarded an
$8.6 million contract.76 The officials entered into a conspiracy to ship hazardous waste
to unpermitted facilities, illegally store and hide hazardous waste from government
officials during inspection, and submitted false statements to government officials. On
November 29, 2018 the defendants were collectively sentenced to 225 months
incarceration and other penalties.77
While these sentencing examples are significant, and show examples of large
penalties in RCRA prosecutions, they also show that other charges drive the
sentencing. Alan Elias is a good example of a knowing endangerment charge with a
stiff sentence that is RCRA-focused, as is the case against Outhwaite. The Dorner and
Fargas cases are drug-related and that drives sentencing. The cases against the
74

Mark Anthony Dorner: (E.D. Missouri 4:00CR396SNL, 2001).
U.S. EPA, 2000, Three Plead Guilty in Missouri Illegal Drug Lab Case, available from:
https://archive.epa.gov/epapages/newsroom_archive/newsreleases/4ebf2903a549d626852569af00
5b9bac.html.
76
U.S. Department of Justice, 2016, Federal Grand Jury Indicts 6 Explo Company Officials for
Offenses Related to Camp Minden, Louisiana Ammunition Disposal, available from:
https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdla/pr/federal-grand-jury-indicts-6-explo-company-officialsoffenses-related-camp-minden.
77
Charles Ferris Callihan: (W.D. Louisiana 16-CR-00214-06, 2018).
75
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Arcangelos and Callihan and Explo Systems are related to RCRA charges, but as well
but connected to other crimes. As with the large corporate penalty cases, large prison
sentences for RCRA crimes alone are decidedly rare.
CONCLUSION
As the regulated community under RCRA grows in the United States or should
grow with a subsequent expansion of the country’s economy, the question of whether
the criminal enforcement apparatus is sufficient to police bad behavior along with the
compliance regime of administrative fines, warnings, and civil actions is an important
one to explore. Our general answer is that approached from a variety of vantage points,
the probability of a facility in the regulated community being detected if committing a
crime is rather low. We find the same for prosecutions. Our summary judgement is that
given detection and punishment probabilities are fairly low over time, the ability of the
federal criminal enforcement regime to deter RCRA crimes appears limited.
An important point of emphasis here is that environmental criminal enforcement
was always underfunded and required to make hard choices with limited resources. 78
The deterrent effect expected would be one seen alongside the civil enforcement
regime and targeted at serious and willful violations of the law. Many acts of companies
and individuals may not constitute violations of the law or may simply be legally
ambiguous as to whether or not such actions are illegal. Chronic violations are not
necessarily criminal actions under the law or policed in such a manner, because many
companies stay in chronic violation for many years before criminal sanctions are
attempted, if at all.79 Criminal enforcement also exists within a broader enforcement
and compliance framework that involves federal civil enforcement, as well as state
enforcement efforts. Within this framework of limitations, we offer three possibilities
for improving what are likely sub-optimal deterrence effects for RCRA criminal
violations.
Detection probabilities are low in our estimation for RCRA crimes. EPA-CID
should be allowed to hire the statutory minimum number of criminal investigators. 80
The rates of detection we estimate are low and that ignores mobile sources, midnight
dumping, and many other crimes. To enhance detection, EPA-CID must simply be
authorized to hire more criminal investigators as prescribed by law and the same must
occur for DOJ-ECS if additional prosecutions are to take place for the sake of
increasing the reasonable potential of punishment. DOJ-ECS only employed 43
prosecutors in 2015 and this number must be increased to have additional
78
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environmental crime-focused attorneys on staff.81 The environmental criminal
enforcement apparatus is effective under limited resources and modest additions to
staff would go far. For example, these collaborations have been found to produce a 67
percent filing rate for criminal charges and a 90 percent conviction rate, which is a
significant value for the investment.82
Another modest remedy for sub-optimal deterrence that involves the addition of
little resources is to enhance the role community stakeholders play in the enforcement
process. A good place to start would be applying principles of community policing
with environmental justice communities living near the fenceline of industrial facilities
strewn throughout the United States. These communities bear the largest health
burdens in the country and there is already a history of environmental justice activism
in many communities and stakeholder inclusion via the EPA’s Office of Environmental
Justice (OEJ).83 OEJ invites these communities to the table for permitting issues,
planning, and must consider their voice if any new burdens are foisted upon them.
Giving them the tools and taking seriously their efforts to police the fenceline could
play a significant role in enhancing a police presence, where EPA-CID lacks resources
or the will to act. The Report a Violation website was introduced in January 2006, and
within a decade EPA-CID opened 35 cases and six of those cases were successfully
prosecuted.84 Expanding this program considerably and allowing a stronger version of
community policing of toxic facilities in environmental justice communities would
help resource-starved administrators.
One final addition to help with detection and punishment of RCRA crimes is to
work to enhance the visibility of environmental crimes and criminals. The general
public rarely appreciates the severity of environmental crimes, even though they
collectively injure more people in the United States than street crime.85 The mass media
rarely pays attention to such crimes and their victims unless there is a large explosion
and instant deaths, an injury, or a major environmental catastrophe. 86 Until much
greater public interest and media attention are drawn to environmental crimes,
policymakers have less of a reason to add sufficient funding for this important work.
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Simply noting case outcomes on EPA and DOJ’s websites or promoting the EPA’s
Fugitives Program are steps in the right direction, but insufficient to achieve the greater
visibility that is needed on this front.87
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